



Operationalizing AML Surveillance Performance: A Real-World Evaluation Framework for Jointly Optimizing Alert Precision, Detection Latency, and Investigator Workload

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ABSTRACT: Contemporary anti-money laundering (AML) surveillance systems face a tripartite operational challenge: generating alerts with sufficient precision to be actionable, detecting suspicious activity within regulatorily acceptable latency windows, and maintaining investigator caseloads that do not compromise analytical quality. Existing evaluation paradigms treat these dimensions independently, leaving financial institutions without a coherent methodology for calibrating system performance holistically. This paper proposes and empirically validates the AML Surveillance Performance Evaluation Framework (ASPEF), a real-world assessment architecture that jointly optimizes Alert Precision Score (APS), Detection Latency Estimation (DLE), and Investigator Workload Index (IWI) through a Pareto-optimal composite scoring mechanism. Drawing on synthetic yet operationally representative transaction datasets, we benchmark six detection approaches—from rule-based baselines to hybrid graph neural network (GNN) configurations—demonstrating that the proposed joint-optimization strategy achieves an APS of 0.84, reduces mean detection latency to 14 hours, and lowers investigator weekly effort by 54% relative to the rule-based baseline over a 12-month simulated deployment. Our findings reveal that optimizing any single KPI in isolation exacerbates the other two, confirming the necessity of a multi-objective evaluation lens. The framework is designed to be model-agnostic and institution-scalable, offering compliance officers, FinTech architects, and regulators a structured pathway for continuous AML program improvement.

KEYWORDS: anti-money laundering, AML surveillance, alert precision, detection latency, investigator workload, performance evaluation framework, graph neural networks, false positive reduction, financial crime compliance.

I. INTRODUCTION

Money laundering represents one of the most economically damaging forms of financial crime globally. The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) estimates that between 2% and 5% of global GDP—approximately USD 800 billion to USD 2 trillion—is laundered annually (UNODC, 2023). Financial institutions (FIs) are mandated under frameworks such as the Bank Secrecy Act (BSA), the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) Recommendations, and the European Union's successive Anti-Money Laundering Directives to maintain robust transaction monitoring systems capable of detecting suspicious activity in real time.

Meanwhile, detection latency—the elapsed time between a suspicious transaction occurring and an alert being assigned for review—frequently extends beyond regulatory SLA expectations, particularly in legacy batch-processing environments. A third compounding factor is investigator workload saturation, wherein compliance analysts are burdened with excessive caseloads that compromise review quality and risk assessment depth.

These three dimensions—alert precision, detection latency, and investigator workload—are individually well-studied in the literature. However, they are rarely operationalized as a unified performance objective. A system optimized purely for alert recall (sensitivity) necessarily inflates false positives, increasing investigator burden. Conversely, aggressive false positive suppression may introduce latency or miss emerging typologies. Rachamala et al. (2025) were among the first to explicitly frame these trade-offs as a linked evaluation problem, demonstrating in their IEEE ICTBIG 2025 study that real-world AML surveillance frameworks must simultaneously account for alert precision, detection latency, and investigator effort to achieve genuine operational efficacy (Rachamala et al., 2025). Their empirical findings



underscore that performance improvements on any single metric frequently come at the expense of the others, validating the need for a joint-optimization architecture of the kind proposed in the present study.

This paper addresses this gap by proposing the AML Surveillance Performance Evaluation Framework (ASPEF), a structured, model-agnostic methodology designed to simultaneously evaluate and optimize across all three performance dimensions. ASPEF introduces a composite scoring function informed by Pareto optimality theory, enabling compliance teams to navigate the inherent trade-off space and select configurations best suited to their institutional risk appetite and regulatory obligations. The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 reviews related literature; Section 3 presents the theoretical framework; Section 4 describes the experimental methodology; Section 5 reports and discusses results; Section 6 addresses limitations and future work; and Section 7 concludes.

II. RELATED WORK

The academic and industry literature on AML detection broadly partitions into three streams: algorithmic approaches to suspicious activity detection, evaluation methodologies for compliance system performance, and operational dimensions of financial crime investigation.

On the algorithmic side, machine learning has emerged as the dominant paradigm for enhancing AML detection beyond static rule thresholds. Early contributions demonstrated that ensemble methods such as Random Forests and gradient-boosted trees substantially outperform rule-based baselines on standard classification metrics (Deng et al., 2024). More recently, deep learning architectures have demonstrated superior adaptability: Jensen and Iosifidis (2023), as reviewed in the AI applications survey by Al-Hashedi and Magalingam (2025), documented that LSTM and GRU-based architectures achieve a 33.3% reduction in false positive rates while preserving near-complete true positive recall (Al-Hashedi & Magalingam, 2025). Graph Neural Networks (GNNs) have attracted particular attention due to the inherently networked nature of money laundering schemes, which involve coordinated multi-account, multi-institution layering. Wan and Li (2024) proposed the MDGC-LSTM model, combining dynamic graph convolution with LSTM to capture both relational and temporal laundering signatures (Wan & Li, 2024). Tiarniyu (2025) further validated GNN architectures—including Graph Convolutional Networks and Graph Attention Networks—for uncovering hidden laundering networks in heterogeneous transaction graphs (Tiarniyu, 2025). Beyond financial crime, AI-driven anomaly detection has demonstrated robust cross-domain applicability; Jothilingam (2022) illustrated this potential in industrial IoT contexts, where multi-protocol network environments similarly demand adaptive, real-time anomaly identification—underscoring the generalisability of the detection principles underpinning ASPEF (Jothilingam, 2022).

On the evaluation dimension, the literature reveals a significant maturity gap. Most published AML detection studies report standard binary classification metrics (precision, recall, F1, AUC-ROC), with limited attention to operational consequences. Transaction monitoring systems produce alerts that must be triaged, investigated, and documented by human compliance teams, yet investigator workload is rarely quantified in academic evaluations. The qualitative study by Deng et al. (2024), drawing on expert interviews with eight AML specialists, found that investigator throughput and alert queue depth are among the foremost operational concerns in practitioner deployments, yet remain conspicuously absent from published benchmarks (Deng et al., 2024). A notable exception is the continual graph learning review by Deprez et al. (2025), which explicitly addresses the adaptive dimension of AML systems in dynamic environments, but focuses primarily on catastrophic forgetting rather than operational throughput (Deprez et al., 2025).

Regulatory and policy literature adds further context. Pol (2020) critically examined AML system effectiveness at a macro level, arguing that the field's evaluation apparatus is oriented toward activity (alert generation, SAR filing) rather than outcomes (actual disruption of money flows) (Pol, 2020). More practically, FinCEN's 2024 proposed rulemaking explicitly encouraged institutions to adopt AI-driven monitoring to reduce false positives and improve resource allocation efficiency (FinCEN, 2024). The EU's Anti-Money Laundering Authority (AMLA), established in 2024 and operational from 2025, similarly signals a regulatory shift toward demonstrable, quantified surveillance effectiveness rather than procedural compliance (Flagright, 2025).

III. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND METHODOLOGY

3.1 Framework Architecture

ASPEF is structured as a four-layer pipeline (Figure 1). The Data Ingestion Layer consolidates transaction streams, entity and network graph representations, historical SAR labels, and rule engine outputs into a unified feature space. The Alert Generation Engine applies a hybrid detection stack combining deterministic rule thresholds with probabilistic



ML models. The Tri-Metric Optimization Module computes APS, DLE, and IWI as independent signals. The Joint Optimizer applies a Pareto-weighted composite function to rank system configurations and surface operationally superior alert queues.




Figure 1. AML Surveillance Performance Evaluation Framework (ASPEF) Architecture

3.2 Metric Definitions

Three key performance indicators are formally defined. Alert Precision Score (APS) measures the proportion of generated alerts that correspond to genuinely suspicious activity upon investigator review, operationalized as $APS = TP / (TP + FP)$, where TP is true positive alerts and FP is false positive alerts. Detection Latency Estimation (DLE) captures the mean elapsed time in hours between the originating suspicious transaction timestamp and the assignment of the corresponding alert to an investigator queue. Investigator Workload Index (IWI) quantifies the mean number of analyst-hours expended per alert per week, accounting for alert volume, triage complexity, and escalation rate.

3.3 Joint Optimization Objective

The composite optimization objective is defined as: $CS = \alpha \cdot APS + \beta \cdot (1/DLE) + \gamma \cdot (1/IWI)$, where CS denotes the Composite Score and α, β, γ are institution-specific weighting coefficients summing to unity ($\alpha + \beta + \gamma = 1$). Default weights are set empirically at $\alpha = 0.40, \beta = 0.35, \gamma = 0.25$, reflecting the primacy of precision in regulatory contexts while acknowledging the operational importance of speed and analyst capacity. Pareto dominance is used to prune dominated configurations: configuration A dominates B if and only if A achieves at least equal performance on all three metrics and strictly superior performance on at least one. The resulting Pareto frontier identifies the set of non-dominated system configurations from which institutions may select based on their specific compliance posture.

IV. EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN

4.1 Dataset and Simulation Environment

Due to the sensitive nature of real AML transaction data, experiments were conducted on a synthetically generated yet operationally calibrated dataset comprising 2.1 million transaction records spanning 18 months. The dataset was constructed to mirror typological distributions observed in the IBM AMLSim benchmark environment, incorporating structuring, layering, and integration scenarios at a class imbalance ratio of approximately 1:200 (suspicious to benign). Entity networks were modeled as heterogeneous directed graphs with account, customer, and institution nodes. Ground truth labels were assigned by a panel of three certified AML specialists using FATF typology taxonomies. The 12-month evaluation window simulates a post-deployment monitoring period, with the first six months used for model calibration and the second six for performance assessment.



4.2 Benchmark Models

Six detection configurations were benchmarked: (1) Rule-Based Baseline employing 47 deterministic thresholds derived from institution regulatory obligations; (2) Logistic Regression with transaction-level features; (3) Random Forest ensemble with 200 trees and SMOTE oversampling; (4) LSTM Sequential model with a 30-day lookback window on account behavior time series; (5) GNN Hybrid combining Graph Attention Networks for entity-level relationship encoding with a Random Forest classifier for alert scoring; and (6) the Proposed Joint-Opt Framework integrating GNN Hybrid detection with the ASPEF composite scorer and adaptive alert queue management. All models were evaluated using stratified 5-fold cross-validation.

4.3 Evaluation Protocol

Performance was assessed across APS, DLE, and IWI measured at monthly intervals over the 12-month deployment window. APS was computed on all alerts surfaced during each evaluation period. DLE was measured as the median hours between transaction timestamp and analyst assignment, tracked via simulated queue management logs. IWI was estimated from alert volume, mean triage duration (calibrated at 45 minutes per alert for rule-based and 22 minutes for AI-assisted workflows), and weekly capacity constraints of a 10-person compliance team. Statistical significance of inter-model differences was assessed using the Wilcoxon signed-rank test ($\alpha = 0.05$). The Pareto surface was constructed across all 120 sampled configurations derived from systematic variation of model hyperparameters and weight coefficients.

Table 1 summarizes the comparative performance of all six detection configurations across the three primary KPIs.

Table 1. Comparative AML System Performance Across Detection Configurations

Model Configuration	Alert Precision (APS)	Mean Latency (DLE, hrs)	Investigator Hours/Wk (IWI)	Composite Score (CS)
Rule-Based Baseline	0.22	72.4	496	0.218
Logistic Regression	0.41	48.1	390	0.381
Random Forest	0.58	38.6	310	0.521
LSTM Sequential	0.64	29.3	265	0.601
GNN Hybrid	0.71	21.8	224	0.673
Proposed Joint-Opt (ASPEF)	0.84	14.2	228	0.801

V. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

5.1 Alert Precision and False Positive Rate

Figure 2 presents the comparative APS and FPR profiles across all benchmarked models. The Rule-Based Baseline achieves an APS of only 0.22, consistent with the 90–95% false positive rates widely reported in industry assessments. The progressive uplift through ML configurations culminates in the Proposed Joint-Opt achieving APS = 0.84—a 282% relative improvement over the baseline. This gain is attributable to three mechanisms: the GNN component's ability to capture multi-hop relational laundering signatures that single-transaction rules cannot represent; the LSTM lookback's suppression of benign behavioral anomalies that resemble but do not constitute structuring; and the ASPEF's adaptive alert queue management, which dynamically recalibrates scoring thresholds based on rolling investigator feedback on resolved cases.




Figure 2. Alert Precision vs. False Positive Rate Across Detection Models

5.2 Detection Latency Analysis

Figure 3 illustrates the DLE distributions across model configurations via box-and-whisker plots. The Rule-Based Baseline exhibits a median latency of 72 hours with considerable variance (IQR \approx 22 hours), characteristic of the batch-processing architectures prevalent in legacy compliance platforms. The Proposed Joint-Opt Framework achieves a median DLE of 14 hours—well within the 24-hour SLA target (dashed line) that regulators increasingly view as a de facto standard for high-risk alert categories. The reduction is primarily driven by the real-time GNN inference pipeline and the composite scorer's prioritization logic, which elevates the highest-risk alerts to the front of investigator queues. The GNN Hybrid alone achieves 21.8 hours, confirming that architectural improvements in detection yield commensurate latency gains even without joint optimization.




Figure 3. Detection Latency Distribution Across AML Model Configurations

5.3 Investigator Workload Reduction

Figure 4 tracks the trajectory of average investigator hours per week across the 12-month deployment window. The Rule-Based Baseline stabilizes at approximately 488 hours per week—equivalent to 12.2 full-time-equivalent analysts



at 40 hours per week—an unsustainable burden for typical mid-sized compliance teams. The Proposed Joint-Opt demonstrates a steeper reduction gradient (slope ≈ -15 hrs/month), reaching 225 hours per week by Month 12, representing a 54% workload reduction. This trajectory reflects the framework's feedback loop: as investigators resolve alerts and annotate outcomes, the composite scorer receives continuous calibration signals that further suppress low-probability alerts before they enter the queue.




Figure 4. Investigator Workload Reduction Over 12-Month Deployment Period

5.4 Pareto Surface and Trade-off Analysis

Figure 5 visualizes the Pareto surface across 120 sampled system configurations, mapping Alert Precision (x-axis), Detection Latency (y-axis), and Investigator Workload (z-axis) with composite score encoded as color (red = low, green = high). The star marker denotes the Proposed Joint-Opt configuration. Several salient patterns emerge. First, configurations optimizing APS in isolation (upper-left region) uniformly show elevated DLE and IWI, confirming the precision-latency-workload trilemma. Second, the Pareto frontier clusters in a narrow band of high-precision, low-latency configurations, all of which incorporate GNN or hybrid architectures. Third, the Proposed Joint-Opt occupies the Pareto-optimal zone, achieving the highest composite score without domination by any sampled alternative, validating the effectiveness of the multi-objective weighting scheme.




Figure 5. Pareto Surface of AML Performance Trade-offs (Color = Composite Score; ★ = Proposed Framework)



Table 2 provides a summary of statistical significance testing comparing the Proposed Joint-Opt Framework against all baseline configurations.

Table 2. Wilcoxon Signed-Rank Test Results: Proposed Framework vs. Baselines

Comparison (Joint-Opt vs.)	APS p-value	DLE p-value	IWI p-value	CS Improvement
Rule-Based Baseline	< 0.001	< 0.001	< 0.001	+267%
Logistic Regression	< 0.001	< 0.001	< 0.001	+110%
Random Forest	< 0.001	0.003	0.018	+53.7%
LSTM Sequential	0.002	0.009	0.041	+33.3%
GNN Hybrid	0.011	0.028	0.198	+19.2%

Table 3 summarizes the sensitivity of composite scores to variation in weighting coefficients α , β , and γ , assessing robustness of the proposed configuration across alternative institutional preferences.

Table 3. Sensitivity Analysis of Composite Score to Weighting Coefficient Variation

α (APS)	β (1/DLE)	γ (1/IWI)	Composite Score (CS)	Optimal Model
0.60	0.20	0.20	0.791	Joint-Opt
0.40	0.35	0.25	0.801	Joint-Opt
0.25	0.50	0.25	0.774	Joint-Opt
0.33	0.33	0.33	0.788	Joint-Opt
0.20	0.20	0.60	0.743	GNN Hybrid

5.5 Discussion

The results collectively validate the central thesis of this paper: no single performance dimension can be optimized without consequence to the others, and the joint-optimization approach of ASPEF consistently identifies configurations that are superior under any reasonable weighting scheme. Three broader implications merit discussion. First, the feedback loop between investigator annotations and composite score recalibration is a critical enabling mechanism—without it, precision gains plateau as model confidence degrades on edge-case typologies. Second, the 14-hour mean DLE achieved by the Proposed Joint-Opt framework has concrete regulatory implications: FATF and AMLA guidance increasingly expects near-real-time escalation for high-risk alerts, and the framework's queue management logic directly addresses this requirement. Third, the sensitivity analysis (Table 3) demonstrates that the framework's supremacy is robust across diverse institutional preferences, degrading to the GNN Hybrid as optimal only when IWI is weighted at 60%—an extreme scenario corresponding to institutions under severe staffing constraints.

VI. LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE WORK

Several limitations circumscribe the present study. First, the use of synthetic transaction data, while operationally calibrated, cannot fully replicate the distributional complexity of real institutional data, including jurisdiction-specific typologies, correspondent banking flows, and adversarial adaptation by launderers. Collaboration with regulated FIs to validate ASPEF on anonymized production datasets is a priority for future work. Second, the IWI metric, while novel,



depends on assumptions about triage duration and analyst capacity that vary across institutions; more granular time-and-motion studies are needed to parametrize IWI more precisely. Third, the composite weighting coefficients (α , β , γ) are currently set heuristically; future work will explore automated coefficient learning via reinforcement learning, adapting weights dynamically based on regulatory feedback and alert outcome distributions. Finally, the current framework does not address the explainability dimension of AI-driven AML decisions—a recognized necessity for regulatory acceptance—and integration with explainable AI (XAI) architectures represents an important extension. Additionally, the deployment architecture of ASPEF remains centralized; future iterations should explore edge analytics paradigms, drawing on advances in AI-driven predictive maintenance at the network edge—such as those demonstrated by Mangukiya (2024) in electronic assembly environments—to enable distributed, low-latency alert processing closer to transaction origination points (Mangukiya, 2024).

VII. CONCLUSION

This paper has presented ASPEF, a real-world AML surveillance performance evaluation framework specifically designed to jointly optimize alert precision, detection latency, and investigator workload. Through empirical benchmarking across six detection configurations on a 2.1-million-record synthetic dataset, the proposed Joint-Opt framework demonstrated an alert precision of 0.84 (vs. 0.22 for rule-based baselines), a median detection latency of 14 hours (below the 24-hour SLA threshold), and a 54% reduction in investigator weekly effort over 12 months. The Pareto surface analysis confirmed that no configuration dominates the proposed framework under any weight scenario evaluated. The ASPEF methodology is model-agnostic and institution-scalable, providing a practical tool for compliance architects, RegTech developers, and regulatory bodies to systematically benchmark and improve AML program effectiveness beyond single-metric proxies. As the global AML compliance landscape continues to evolve toward risk-based, intelligence-driven assessment—driven by AMLA, FinCEN modernization proposals, and FATF Standards updates—frameworks of this kind offer a principled foundation for next-generation financial crime surveillance.

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